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CHAPTER 6 
Corporations and Partnerships 
CHALMERS A. PEAIRS, JR. 
§6.1. Cumulative voting legislation. A device frequently employed 
to insure at least a minimum representation to minority stockhold-
ers is the privilege of cumulative voting, under which a stockholder is 
permitted to cast all his votes for one, or. a few, candidates, instead of 
being limited to one vote per share per candidate. 
The effect of a cumulative voting privilege is perhaps best sum-
marized by noting that it establishes a republican, as distinct from a 
democratic, form of corporate government. This form of government 
is guaranteed to stockholders by constitutional provision in a few 
states, and by statute in others. Where there is no express provision 
on the point, cumulative voting privileges are not automatic, but can 
normally be provided for in the corporate charter (that is, in the 
agreement of association and/or articles of organization, in Massachu-
setts); and this has long been true in this Commonwealth.1 
In this permissive situation, there has never been much occasion 
for litigation in Massachusetts on cumulative voting; nor was there 
any here in 1955. A cause celebre did arise, however, in another 
state, where the rule is mandatory.2 This year the Massachusetts legis-
lature enacted an express permissive statute, authorizing provision for 
cumulative voting in corporate articles or agreements of associa-
tion.a This statute appears to add nothing to pre-existing law, but 
merely restates the practice which has existed here for many years. 
In a number of nationally important corporations there were dur-
CHALMERS A. PEAIRS, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law 
and a member of the Massachusetts and West Virginia Bars. He is the author of 
Massachusetts Business Corporations (1954). 
§6.1. 1 See, generally, Stevens, Corporations §1l7 (2d ed. 1949); Ballantine, Corpo-
rations §1l7 (1946); Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations §2048. The matter has 
not previously been expressly dealt with in Massachusetts law, though the permis-
sive implications of the statutes were sufficiently clear to obviate the necessity of 
litigating the point. The possibility of such provisions is recognized, semble, in 
Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 556, 159 N.E. 70 (1927). 
2 Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Il1.2d 78, 126 N .E.2d 701 (1955). A good comment on this 
case appeared in 9 Miami L.Q. 365 (1955). 
a Acts of 1955, c. 173. 
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ing the year bitter fights over the election of directors.4 These 
brought into prominence rules governing the solicitation and use of 
proxies, and the establishment and maintenance of a quorum, as well 
as the cumulative voting device. Of particular interest was the tactical 
problem arising under the latter. 
The maximum number of directors which any block of stockholders 
can be sure to elect is determinable by the formula 
D = V(B + I) -1 
S 
where D is the number of directors who can be elected, V is the num-
ber of votes available, B is the total number on the board to be 
elected, and S is the total number of shares of stock voting in the 
election.5 However, if one faction tries to elect more or fewer than 
its maximum, an opposing faction may be able to improve on its 
chances under the formula.6 If, for example, the majority tried to 
elect the entire board, its candidates would get sixty votes each, and 
the minority could thus elect a majority of the board, casting seventy-
two votes for each of five candidates. On the other hand, if the 
minority tried to elect only two directors, the majority could elect the 
remaining seven, practically by default. The tactical question, then, 
is how large a representation on the board to try for, considering not 
only the formula but also what the opposing group(s) may try to do. 
The poker playing involved in this decision was a major factor in 
more· than one large recent "proxy fight," 7 and demonstrated that a 
4 See, among many other news accounts, the following: 
Busi'ness Week: Trying to Run Railroads, Feb. 20,. 1954, p. 28; Wild, Wooly Cen-
tral Fight for N Y Central: New Faces and ICC, Too, Mar. 6, 1954, p. 26; It's an 
Old-Fashioned Free-for-All, Apr. 10, 1954, p. 52; Back to Roost, Apr. 10, 1954, p. 61; 
He's Taking Over the New Haven, Apr. 24, 1954, p. 33; Meeting Settles Down to a 
Long Count, June 5, 1954, p. 29; Fighting All Over the Lot, Feb. 26, 1955, p. 26; 
Ready for the Rollcall at Ward, Apr. 9, 1955, p. 27; Wolfson Gets a Foot in Mont-
gomery Ward's Boardroom, Apr. 30, 1955, p. 28. 
Fortune: Maurer, Central Rolls Again, May, 1954, p. 86; How Young Got the 
Votes, Aug. 1954, p. 87; What's Good for Montgomery Ward? Dec_ 1954, p. 93; Wolf-
son, Reply, Feb. 1955, p. 23. 
New Yorker: Brooks, Great Proxy Fight, July 3, 1954, p. 28; Our Plunging Cor-
respondents, May 21, 1955, p. 100. 
Concerning an English management fight, see Gower, Corporate Control: The 
Battle for the Berkeley, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1176 (1955). 
A possible correlation between the incidence of intracorporate management con-
tests and the availability of cumulative voting is suggested by Williams, Cumulative 
Voting, 33 Harv. Bus. Rev. 108, 113 (1955). 
5 See, inter alia, Gerstenberg, Mathematics of Cumulative Voting, 9 J. Accountancy 
177 (1910). 
6 See Cook, Corporations §609 a. (8th ed. 1923). 
7 See X = 1 + YN, IN + 1 Plus Bluffing, Business Week, Apr. 23, 1955, p. 31; 
Handbook to Cumulative Voting, id. May 1, 1954, p. 68. 
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§6.2 CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 67 
good bit more than simple electoral strength is involved in fixing the 
composition of a board of directors in a corporation whose stock-
holders are split into antagonistic factions. 
§6.2. Business development corporations: The Back Bay develop-
ment. The fact that the American nation, though substantially united 
politically, remains, perhaps inevitably, economically provincialized, 
has taken an increasingly prominent place in public attention during 
the past fifteen years. The Federal Government, to be sure, has not as 
yet developed an integrated, coherent policy on the interrelation of 
the various economic provinces; but the latter, conscious perhaps of 
the maxim about those who help themselves, have done much for 
their own well-being. The South and the Southwest have been the 
most aggressive regions, in this respect, on the mainland. They have 
been closely followed by the Pacific Northwest, but the South has been 
of greatest interest to New England observers, as it has appeared that 
much of the South's increase in relative wealth has been at the ex-
pense of New England. 
Since about 1950 much has been done in the New England area 
designed to improve its economic situation. Public consciousness of 
the problem has been stimulated by vast publicity programs; political 
figures have done a great deal of talking, directed mostly toward re-
couping New England's relative position by trying to obtain discrimi-
natory favors from the Federal Government; and every New England 
state has launched an organized program designed to improve its ab-
solute economic situation. All these types of activity, moreover, have 
been carried on as well in behalf of separate localities, and particu-
larly by the larger cities.1 
The mechanism which has been used as the framework of most of 
this work is the development corporation. This device, a nonprofit, 
specially chartered corpqration, like the Boy Scouts, the Red Cross, 
the Emergency Shipping Fleet Corporation, or the RFC, has been 
used by every New England state and by a number of smaller areas, 
and is also increasingly thought of as the means of carrying out new 
federal ventures in areas such as atomic energy exploitation or medi-
cal research. In many of these cases, of course, such a corporation 
carries out a purely governmental function, serving as a substitute for 
the administrative commission, and employed because of the greater 
operating efficiency and flexibility of the corporate structure, and to 
obtain some freedom from the defects common among such commis-
sions. Frequently, however, the reason for this form is that the task 
to be done is proprietary rather than governmental- the traditional 
raison d'etre of the governmental corporation - or, as here, that the 
§6.2. 1 The creation in 1953 of the Massachusetts Department of Commerce, and 
the activities of the Department, including the incorporation of the Massachusetts 
Business Development Corporation, by Acts of 1953, c. 671, form the most significant 
local example of this kind of activity. 
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task is unrelated in nature to those traditionally performed by govern-
mental agencies.2 
The development corporation characteristically acts as stimulus, 
catalyst, middleman, promoter, publicity and public relations agent, 
and perhaps as underwriter, for new business in a given area. Private 
agencies may be doing parallel work, and are aided and encouraged 
by the public corporation when they are. There may also be the jobs 
of policing such development, by devising and applying regulations to 
keep its progress orderly, efficient, and inoffensive to potential critics 
or opponents; of allocating special benefits which the state may have 
provided on a limited basis; and of administering such benefits where 
they are available to all participants in the program. Principal 
among these latter is the tax concession - abatement, moratorium, 
special deduction, discriminatory assessment, and the like - and 
herein lay a constitutional question considered by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court Justices during the 1955 SURVEY year. 
An opportunity for an artificially stimulated development of this 
kind, with consequent long-range advantages to Boston, was seen in 
the discontinuance of use of the twenty-eight-acre railroad yard in the 
Back Bay area. A special commission, created at the Governor's sug-
gestion in 1954,3 recommended creation of a Back Bay Development 
Corporation, and in the legislation filed for this purpose included 
several proposals for tax concessions to this corporation, largely in the 
nature of fixed assessment ceilings and deferred collection procedures.4 
The constitutionality of this proposed act was the subject of a request 
by the Massachusetts Senate for an opinion of the Supreme Judicial 
Court; the Justices found that the tax concessions contained would be 
unconstitutiona1.5 The discrimination in favor of one taxpayer, they 
pointed out, is necessarily also a discrimination against other tax-
payers, denying them the proportionate sharing of government costs, 
the corollary proportional assessments, and the equal protection of 
2 The Massachusetts program has been to a large extent carried on through this 
device. See Woods, A Report on the Massachusetts Business Development Corpo-
ration to Date, published in the September, 1955, issue of Industry, the organ of 
the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, and separately available through the 
MBDC. See also a study for the Filene Foundation, No.1 Step in Commercial and 
Industrial Promotion (1950); and various publications of the Industrial Development 
Committee of the New England Council and of the Boston Federal Reserve Bank. 
Many issues of the latter's Monthly Review during about the past five years have 
dealt with the business development corporation, including development credit 
corporations (used in Maine), and with the related device of the industrial founda-
tion. These reviews include specific descriptions of programs at the municipal 
level, including those at Danbury, Ware, Belfast, Laconia, and Worcester (the last-
named operates more informally, through a local Committee for Economic Develop-
ment). 
3 Resolves of 1954, c. 98. The Governor's message is House Doc. 2936 (1954). 
4 The Commission's report, with the text of the proposed act appended, is Senate 
Doc. 580 (1955). 
5 Opinion of the Justices, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 541, 126 N.E.2d 795. 
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§6.4 CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 69 
the laws, guaranteed by Article X of the Declaration of Rights and 
Article IV of the Massachusetts Constitution, and by Amendment 
XIV of the Federal Constitution. 
The consequence of this opinion seems to be that in Massachusetts, 
at least, and very likely elsewhere as well, discriminatory tax benefits 
cannot be included in the inducements offered by business develop-
ment programs; the decision appears to be of major consequence, if it 
is followed, as such benefits have played a large part in such develop-
ment activities, across the country, up until this time. This case is 
further discussed in another chapter.6 
§6.3. The Dartmouth College law. A separate point presented in 
the Back Bay Development Corporation opinion1 responded to the 
question whether the powers, duties, and existence of the proposed 
corporation could constitutionally be guaranteed against impairment 
in any way which would affect adversely the rights of lenders, while 
any borrowings remained outstanding. The Justices found this pro-
posal unconstitutional, it being in direct conflict with Article LIX of 
the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, which requires 
that "Every charter, franchise or act of incorporation shall forever re-
main subject to revocation and amendment," and they expressly re-
jected the idea of regarding such a provision as a contract of the Com-
monwealth and thus exempt from the constitutional bar. 
§6.4. Fiduciary business relationships. There are some business 
relationships, such as those of director and corporation, of principal 
and agent, or of members of a partnership, the essential ingredient of 
whose existence is a mutual general agency among the partners. In 
other cases, where the obligations of these relationships are violated, 
or where there has been fraud or trickery, a secondary fiduciary rela-
tionship may be imposed, through the medium of a constructive 
trust. Several Massachusetts cases during the 1955 SURVEY year de-
cided questions, largely factual, as to the existence of one kind or an-
other of fiduciary business relationship. 
Barry v. Covich 1 and Martin v. Stone2 arose from efforts to invoke 
the rule that when one acquires for himself property which he owes 
a fiduciary obligation to acquire for another, a constructive trust 
will be impressed on such property to get it into the hands of the one 
who should have had it. In each case the Court assumed the exist-
ence of the rule, and the Court's language points toward applying it 
broadly rather than narrowly; but in each case plaintiff failed in es-
tablishing factually the pre-existing fiduciary relationship - an agency 
in Barry v. Covich, a partnership in Martin v. Stone - on which the 
constructive trust claim was based. 
6 See §11.6 in/m. 
§6.3. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 541, 126 N.E.2d 795. 
§6.4. 1332 Mass. 338, 124 N.E.2d 921 (1955). 
21955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 471, 126 N.E.2d 196. 
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Plaintiffs' difficulty in Barry v. Covich was that there was no one 
who could qualify as principal of the alleged agency. Defendants' 
negotiations were with a committee of members of a social club; but 
the club itself did not, as an unincorporated association, have legal 
existence and thus could not be a principal, nor sue in court; the 
committee lacked by-law authority to bind all the members as a group 
of individuals; and no intent appeared either that the members ne-
gotiating should themselves alone be the principals, or that all mem-
bers ("playing members" of the golf club) should be principals of 
an actual agency, as many of the latter lacked even knowledge of the 
transaction. 
In Martin v. Stone plaintiff's contention was that he and defendant 
were partners; but all that appeared was that they had been, with 
another, principal stockholders of two corporations. The Court 
pointed out that this "did not make them partners or either corpora-
tion a partnership," a and held the use of the term "partner" in the 
parties' conversations insufficient to show intent to form a partner-
ship, lacking the essential elements of such an association_4 
In Keith Oil Corp. v. Keith 5 one question related to the propriety 
of discharging a bookkeeper whose tenure was contractually guaran-
teed "except for failure properly to discharge [his duty]." It ap-
peared that the bookkeeper had given information concerning the 
corporation to one hostile to the management, and this was held suffi-
cient ground for discharge. The Court refers to the bookkeeper's job 
as a "position of confidence," and the decision seems to attach a cer-
tain fiduciary flavor to the position.6 
§6.5. Corporate accounting. A second issue in the Keith Oil Corp.1 
case was the interpretation of a promissory note acceleration provi-
sion in case of "a loss for any full year of operation." A holding for 
obligors was based primarily on the proposition that such a clause 
should be construed to apply only to full years completed after oblig-
ors assumed management controI.2 The trial court also found that a 
calendar business year would be normal in this business, which is 
seasonal, and that in point of fact there was actually no loss during 
a 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 476, 126 N.E.2d at 200. 
4 It also seemed that plaintiff admitted himself out of court on the partnership 
claim by using the terms "joint venture" and "co-adventurer" in his appellate brief. 
The Court's express comment on this point, moreover, may contain an implied hold-
ing on the possibility of basing a constructive trust on breach of faith in a joint 
venture, as distinct from a partnership; but this is not clear, as breach of faith was 
not taken to be established by the evidence here. 
51955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 479, 126 N.E.2d 185. This case is another chapter in a 
protracted intra-family quarrel which also gave rise to Ashley v. Keith Oil Corp., 
73 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1947). 
6 See also Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, 321 Mass. 57, 7I N.E.2d 580 (1947); 
Oehme v. Whittemore-Wright Co., 279 Mass. 558,181 N.E. 733 (1932). 
§6.5. 1 1955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 479, 126 N.E.2d 185. 
2 And see Stein v. Strathmore Worsted Mills, 221 Mass. 86, 108 N.E. 1029 (1915). 
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§6.6 CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 71 
any year, whenever beginning and ending; and the appellate court in 
its holding did not dispute these findings.3 
§6.6. Corporate parties in actuality and in estoppel. In two cases 
corporate defendants in contract actions argued that they had not been 
parties to the contracts sued on. In the first, Wallach v. Hadley CO.,l 
the question was largely whether the contracting agent could bind 
defendant to pay for plaintiff's services to all members of a multi-
corporation business. Holding that he could, the Court relied on 
evidence of actual authority of the agent to deal with affairs of all the 
members of defendant's concern, and summarily rejected the sugges-
tion that it would be ultra vires for defendant, apparently the parent 
or central corporation ("the main store"), to hire such services for 
other corporate members of the concern, distinguishing the accommo-
dation indorsement cases.2 
In Wiley & Foss v. Saxony Theatres3 the facts taken for purposes of 
the appeal were that defendant's agent hired plaintiff to do work in 
its theater, and that later the same agent hired plaintiff to do similar 
work in another theater, owned by a different corporation, doing busi-
ness at the same address, with largely the same offices as defendant, 
and now insolvent, and that no advance notice was given plaintiff that 
the later work was contracted for in behalf of a different corporation. 
The Court addressed itself in its opinion principally to matters of evi-
dence. Apparently the legal point of defendant's liability on the con-
tract, which was an express ground of defense, is assumed in plaintiff's 
favor on the ground of estoppel, but this is not express in the opinion, 
which seems regrettably laconic on the point. 
3 It is arguable whether the existence of these apparently independently sufficient 
grounds for the decision weakens the case, or whether the willingness of the Court 
to decide the legal point, rather than resting on the factual findings, indicates 
stronger than normal opinions on the law. It may, of course, hint some unexpressed 
reservations on the findings themselves, rather than any particular strength of con· 
viction on the law. The record in the case supports the factual findings, indicating 
that the alleged loss for the earlier fiscal year rested on bookkeeping error. Record, 
pp. 61·71, especially at 69. 
§6.6. 1331 Mass. 699, 122 N.E.2d 355 (1954). 
2 Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel Russell Boiler Works, 258 Mass. 453, 155 
N.E. 422 (1927); Bennett v. Corporation Finance Co., 258 Mass. 306. 154 N.E. 835 
(1927). 
3332 Mass. 172. 124 N.E.2d 903 (1955). 
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